Abstract--A cost assignment model is proposed for the expansion of electrical transmission systems, based on the cooperation and interaction principles that are the foundation of the cooperative game theory. A solution algorithm is proposed that considers the development of independent cooperative games for each expansion segment and whose final assignment can be obtained by any game theory solution method (Kernel, Nucleolus, Shapley Value, etc.). The Kernel method was chosen because it has both equilibrium and transparency characteristics in the computation of final assignments.
I. INTRODUCTION he presence of economies of scale and the specificity of the electrical transmission assets transform them into a natural monopoly. These features provide strong coalition signals to the agents that use the network, interested in decreasing their final cost assignments, including costs sub additivities.
The challenge is to determine an adequate tariff scheme for electrical transmission that provides signals for system expansion. Alternatives for transmission expansion in present day power markets differ in the degree of intervention by the regulator in decisions made by the agents. On one extreme, the regulator totally defines expansion, while on the other; the regulator does not intervene and lets agents decide under basic defined rules. Network expansion arises as a system need, given physical and economic signals, and it is the result of the interaction by the agents that directly, or indirectly, participate in the network.
A network expansion can generate multiple effects, such as load flow changes, relief of congested lines, etc., as well as a variation of the benefit of the connected agents, depending on existing expansion plans. Game theory, and cooperative game theory in particular, arises as an appealing tool to deal with the matter, with advantages over other cost assignment methods, given it considers interaction by the agents and their rationality in decision making. Publication [1] recognized early the value of cooperative game theory as applied today (Shapley Value, Kernel, etc.), for planning power investment, and even proposed the "disruptive propensity" method, to measure interest by agents to belong to coalitions. Later on, the incorporation of multiagent modeling, the introduction of "Distributed Artificial Intelligence" and the associated computational tools, have allowed to improve the process of formation of agent coalitions, giving more transparency to allocations. This has allowed to analyze problems with a greater number of agents, and also to develop games in markets where agents act in a decentralized way, under different conditions and scenarios [2] [3] [4] . This work differs from previous studies in that it analyzes total cost allocation for transmission expansion as a sum of individual cost allocations for each expansion segment, without isolating the technical and economic effects that the expansion segment produces on the network. The proposed model considers the characteristics of the costs subadditivities existing in cooperative game theory, formulating an algorithm that can be adapted to any network under expansion and that can be solved through any solution method in game theory.
The network example used by Garver [5] to determine optimal transmission expansion has become a classic model to compare different network expansion methods and is also used in this work.
II. GAME THEORY
Game theory has developed in two currents. The noncooperative game theory analyzes the agents' interactions (individual or group) in a competitive environment, and the cooperative game theory analyzes their interaction in a cooperative environment.
The characteristics to create coalitions, payment factors and general features of cooperative games have specific structure and concepts. The most characteristic ones and the ones used 
, where "n" is the total number of players.
In a game, despite players take autonomous market decisions, they are interested in forming coalitions to achieve lower final costs. This association agreement is the basic ingredient of the cooperative games mathematical model that is called "coalition".
N is the coalition of all agents that participate in the game, and it is normally called the great coalition.
Mathematically, a coalition S is a subset of N ( N S ⊂ ). To form a coalition S , it is required that each player belonging to it agrees to stay in the coalition.
N S ⊂ ∀
, the characteristic function V of a game, is the lowest cost ) (S V (in sub-additive games) that the members of S obtain when acting as a coalition. The best coalition, from the viewpoint of the characteristic function, will conclude the game. For a null coalition, 0
The payment vector → X , given the existing characteristics among its final assignments, can fulfill a set of rationalities. It allows to determine the characteristics of the different cost assignments and how the agents understand them. From the viewpoint of the expansion, the rationalities are the following:
The addition of the final assignments for each agent must be equal to the total cost of the expansion.
(b) Individual rationality:
Each agent has a final cost assignment that is less or equal (if it remains indifferent to a coalition) to the cost of investing alone in the expansion. 
If
For any coalition S , the summation of the final cost assignments of the agents that form part of it, must be less or equal to the characteristic function of that coalition.
Additionally, if an allocation fulfills (3), a new concept is defined: "the core", as a set of allocations that fulfill the three rationalities (1, 2 and 3) When the core is not empty, the cooperative demand of all the coalition S is greater, because the payment vector → X , fulfills all the rationalities (1), (2) and (3). On the contrary, when the core is empty, there is at least one agent that is in disagreement, and because of it, (3) is not fulfilled.
A. Excess Theory
The excess theory is focused on the stability and equilibrium in the assignment of costs, for them to be "of benefit" for the players and the coalitions that have been formed.
Excess (4) for a coalition S will be defined as the difference between the addition of individual cost assignments ( i X ) that the agents belonging to S have, and the cost of the characteristic function for such a coalition. Under this scenario, surplus is defined as the gains or savings in costs (depending on the nature of the problem, benefits or costs, respectively) that a group of agents would get if they formed a coalition
III. KERNEL The Kernel theory is a method to solve the cooperative game theory (specifically, the excess theory) that was introduced by Davis and Maschler in 1965 [7] .
To assess the interaction between two agents, the maximum surplus among them is considered. It is defined by the maximum surplus (4) of all possible coalitions that an agent can establish compared to its peers, excluding the agent with whom it is interacting. That is to say, if ij S is the maximum surplus between agent "i" over agent "j", with respect to a coalition configuration, then:
Where: ) (C e : Is the surplus in all coalitions S that include "i" and exclude "j".
The agent that has the higher surplus is defined as strong in the coalition process, because it has a stronger negotiation power in the coalition formation process, while other agents are defined as weak.
Agent "i" is considered to be "stronger" than agent "j" if:
: Characteristic function of agent "j" before it forms a coalition.
Final cost assignment for agent "j", once it has formed the coalition.
The strong agent demands from the weak agent part of the benefit (6) that it receives when it forms a coalition with the former one, corresponding to the costs saving obtained from a lower cost assignment, compared to its previous condition. However, the weak agent would be ready to give away this benefit, provided it does not violate its individual rationality (2), because under that scenario, it would not be interested in forming the coalition, given the fact that the coalition is not favorable for it.
Kernel's idea is to balance the relative strengths between the agents that form a coalition in order to reach an equilibrium; so, through the payment vector → X , the agents will be benefited in a fair manner and there will not be a breaching of any rationality.
In particular, "i" and "j" are in equilibrium if any of the following relationships is satisfied:
In equations (8) and (9), the equalities represent the lack of desire from the weak agent to deliver any benefit that violates its individual rationality (2), because under that scenario, the coalition would not be attractive for it.
Using the concept of equilibrium, the Kernel can be defined as the set of all coalition configurations (and their associated payments) where the agents are in equilibrium (according to (7) , (8) and (9)).
The Kernel, as costs assignment, shows the following advantages:
(i) The Kernel provides a unique solution for the process of coalition formation developed by the game.
(ii) The Kernel belongs to the core (if it exists) of the game to be computed, fulfilling the three coalition rationalities (1), (2) and (3).
(iii) If there is no core, the Kernel does not involve the agent that does not form the coalition in the costs assignment and it assigns the cost of participating alone in the expansion (stand-alone costs).
(iv) The Kernel assignment corresponds to a strength equilibrium between the agents belonging to a coalition. Therefore, the Kernel is a fair assignment from the perspective of the negotiation process.
(v) The Kernel has a structure to form coalitions that is transparent, in an information medium that is perfect between the agents (vi) In [8] , it is claimed that the Kernel is "an assignment scheme that is clean and uses symmetry principles to assign benefits". From this, one can infer that symmetrical agents (with equal characteristics) are assigned equal costs, and that is a condition that is not seen in other solution methods.
However, the Kernel also shows disadvantages, such as: (i) Costs assignments depend on the coalition structure created. Therefore, it depends on the coalition creation process. From this, one can conclude that there could be multiple Kernel before starting the game assignment.
(ii) The coalition creation in the Kernel requires perfect information between the agents that will form the coalition. That is because it depends on the excess (4) the different coalitions have. If that information is not perfect (information asymmetry), the assignment will be biased. Information becomes a competitive advantage within an environment of cooperation (the prisoner's dilemma).
The disadvantages of the Kernel can be ignored if one considers it a cost assignment process made by an independent agent, that demands perfect information from the agents involved, while regulating and developing the process of coalition creation in a transparent manner.
IV. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions will be considered for the model analysis:
(i) The expansion decisions for the transmission system are made by a central planner, an independent agent, which bases its decisions on network needs. These decisions are made before the development of the model.
(ii) Only the costs derived from such a central plan will be assigned.
(iii) The load evolution will depend on its residential, commercial and industrial components ( Figure 1) .
(iv) The generators connected to the network will be the agents that will participate in the games to assign the transmission line expansion costs.
(v) An economic dispatch of the power stations connected to the transmission system is considered, as a function of the operating marginal costs for such power stations. According to a merit list, the cheapest one is dispatched first. A generation re-dispatch is considered, if needed, to avoid a violation of the maximum capacity of the transmission lines.
(vi) For each agent, a technical operating minimum corresponding to 10% of its rated capacity is considered, in order to continuously visualize the contributions to the flows in the expansion lines.
(vii) The flow analysis will be made in m representative samples represented by "h", with the possibility to extrapolate to a continuous analysis.
(viii) The network sections will be identified in general terms as q p − , where the q p < relationship is always fulfilled.
V. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The model considers a solution algorithm for a network with "n" buses (considering all the expansions made by the planner) (Figure 2) .
The algorithm starts assuming the network and its expansion are known. Once the expansion segment of interest is identified, an analysis of m representative samples of the flow, generation and load characteristics is made.
Each sample is obtained from a DC flow [9] calculation (calculation of active power flow circulating through the lines on each operating condition), for the network for the corresponding time condition. Such computation will depend on:
• Physical conditions of the network (reactance).
• Actual load, depending on the per unit level given by the load nature.
• Generation, depending on the economic dispatch made every sample, according to the merit order. Any change to these variables will directly affect the final game assignment. Once the flows are obtained, the GSDF parameters or A factors (power injection change distribution parameters [10] , which measure the network incremental use by generators or loads), are calculated in order to determine the GGDF parameters or D factors (generalized generation distribution parameters, which measure the total network use, not incremental, made by generator injections). With the latter ones, it is possible to obtain the individual contribution made by each agent (generator) "i" to the total flow through the expansion line, as
If the model wants to consider consumers as agents, parameters GLDF, which can be calculated with parameters GSDH, measure the line use by loads, as negative generations.
Thus, the m representative samples provide a broad spectrum of individual contributions made by each agent in the expansion line. This spectrum is used to determine the maximum, non-coincidental, line utilization made through the analysis range by the individual ("i") or group (" S ") agents. This is calculated with equations (11) and (12) .
In order to obtain the game conditions for the expansion line being analyzed (p-q), the following relationship is defined between the line cost and its real maximum flow (flow of the great coalition N), that corresponds to the capacity economic use [10] .
It is assumed that the investment for each line in the transmission system is determined taking as fundamental parameter the flow under conditions of maximum demand for that line. The game conditions for the agents or agent coalitions in each expansion line are obtained multiplying their maximum non-coincident use by the corresponding $/MW of the segment (p-q). In this manner, for each expansion line a cooperative game is created, that is independent from the games of other expansions. This idea is an abstraction of that proposed by [11] , where any transmission line is used by different wheeling transactions, the total line flow depending on both magnitude and direction of the contributions by all agents through time.
Each cooperative game is solved through the desired solution method in order to obtain the corresponding payment vector. The payment vector is added to the initial payment vector, which is initially defined as vector → 0 . Once the analysis for the chosen expansion line is ended, the search for another expansion line is started again, iterating the algorithm in a "loop" that queries for all the segments of the network. If another expansion line is encountered, the indicated process is developed, with game characteristics that are totally independent from other expansion segments. The exercise ends when all the segments of the network have been reviewed. The final payment vector obtained for the network expansion is unique and it is equivalent to the summation of the individual payment vectors for each segment of the expansion.
In the case where the final cost assignment (the addition of the final assignments for all the mini cooperative games) of an agent is a benefit, the principle of the GGDF parameter prorating is applied. In other words, such benefit is distributed among the debtor agents, in proportion to their cost assignments, according to the Kernel principle, where all assignments are symmetrical with respect to the degree of utilization the agents make of the lines.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The model is applied to the classical Garver 6-bus problem [5] (Figure 3) . The dotted lines correspond to the expansion options originally faced by the central planner. The load and generation values indicated in each bus correspond to both maximum loads (addition of maximum non-coincident loads) and the installed generation, respectively.
The total sample will be 24 (m=24), where for each hour of the day there will be one representative sample.
The maximum generation at the generators is:
• 150 MW at bus 1 generator (G1)
• 360 MW at bus 3 generator (G3)
• 600 MW at bus 6 generator (G6) Table I indicates the share of the type of loads at each load bus, while table II shows the cost characteristics and the capacity of the lines that make up the network (including the expansion options).
The network expansion chosen by the planner is the following [4] :
• 4 lines in segment 2-6.
• 2 lines in segment 4-6.
• 1 line in segment 3-5 (in this segment there is already an existing line). The expansion determined by the central planner implies the following conditions:
• Given the expansion chosen, agent G6 can enter into the system and potentially evacuate all its generation, because its bus would have 6 extra lines with a maximum transportation capacity of 600 MW.
• The maximum generation by agent G3 is limited to only 300 MW of its 360 MW maximum capacity, due to the capacities of the lines going out from its bus. It will be considered that agent G6 has the lowest marginal operating cost, while the agent at bus 1 (G1) will be the most expensive one. As a result from dispatch according to the merit order, agent G6 modulates the load curve to the detriment of agents G1 and G3, which only generate their technical minima. Industrial  C1  80  80%  20%  0%  C2  240  30%  20%  50%  C3  40  90%  5%  5%  C4  160  20%  50%  30%  C5  240  30%  30%  40%  C6  0  0%  0%  0%   TABLE II Using that data, the proposed algorithm for each expansion line is applied as explained below.
Segment 2-6
In this segment, four expansion lines were built, with a total cost of $ 120 ($ 30 each line). Table VI shows the game conditions characterizing this mini game. The maximum flow for each individual agent is defined as the maximum flow produced by that agent in that segment in the sampling period. For the example, flows can be obtained directly from table A.2. To determine the maximum flow caused by each coalition, it is necessary to add for each sample the individual flows of those agents belonging to the coalition. The obtained result is the "maximum flow of the coalition". 
The assignment of the Kernel corresponds to the benefit (equation (6)) that each agent obtains when belonging to a coalition, in function of the previously established game conditions.
Segment 4-6
In this segment, the expansion cost is $ 60 (two $ 30 lines). The way to achieve the game conditions is similar to the one developed for segment 2-6, (table VII). Its $/MW is 0.322
Segment 3-5
In this segment, an extra line is added to the existing one, thus, the expansion cost for this segment is $ 20. To determine the coalition game conditions, it is considered that the flow circulating through the expansion line is one-half the flow that circulates through the segment, because the reactance of the expanded line is equal to the one of the existing line.
The game conditions of this segment show up in table VIII. Its $/MW is approximately 0.296.
Given the conditions of the game, the individual and final cost assignment for each segment are determined through the Kernel computation. For that purpose, the COALA-IDEAS [12] computer software is used, and whose results are given in table IX. Note that the costs are equivalent to negative values. When analyzing the final cost assignment, it is possible to observe:
• Agents (generators) have different benefits with each expansion line, when they have different final assignments.
• The signal that shows that agent G6 must pay more for expanded lines, because it is the one that uses them more extensively.
• Agent G1 has the lowest cost assignment because it uses less the expansion lines.
• In segment 2-6, agent G3 has a benefit as a final assignment (positive assignment) because it produces an important counter flow to the contribution by agent G6 in that segment (Appendix). This benefit allows attenuating its final cost assignment.
• It is confirmed that acting in a coalition, in the expansion of transmission, benefits all the agents when compared with an independent action (stand-alone costs). 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the proposed development, one can conclude that: (i) The model presents a set of economic variables (for example, list of merit, line costs, etc.) and technical variables (for example, generation, line capacities, etc.) that can be adjusted to expansion problems in any electrical system.
(ii) The development of the model for each expansion line involves a cooperative game with game characteristics independent from other expansions.
(iii) Agents that contribute with counter flows in any random expansion segment are "compensated". This benefit is reflected in less final cost assignments, or in the best of the cases, in a non-payment of the expansion (when the final cost assignment is a benefit).
(iv) The procedure to determine the game conditions considers a dynamic analysis of the use of expanded lines. It considers the maximum non-coincident uses and the capacity economic use that the agents make, different from the allocation made with generalized parameters (GGDF, GLDF), where cost assignments are typically made for a specific condition (for example, use of lines under maximum demand, etc.) (v) Given that the game conditions are solved through the Kernel, it is possible to have the cost assignment with equilibrium and transparency characteristics in a centralized transmission system.
(vi) Cost assignment can be made by any agent that uses the transmission system, i.e. generators, distributors, generation companies, unregulated customers, etc. Only the generalized parameter used to obtain the individual contributions of the agents (GGDF, GLDF) varies.
(vii) The model is transparent and fair, provided the agents involved have perfect information about their peers. To achieve equivalent final cost assignments, it might be necessary to have an independent entity that enforces both the maximum non-coincident use of each agent and the amounts involved in the expansion.
VIII. APPENDIX
The GGDF parameters obtained in the development of the model proponed for the Garver problem are provided in table A.1. The contributions to the flow of each expansion line, made by the agents using the network in the Garver problem, are given in table A.2. The maximum individual uses are indicated in bold. Table A .2 allows to confirm that the maximum uses that agents make of networks generally do not coincide. That is why this effect is considered in the model jointly with the economic benefit for the network capacity. G1  G3  G6  G1  G3  G6  G1  G3  G6  0 In particular, if one needs to determine the contribution of a coalition of agents to the flow, it is necessary to add the individual contributions of the agents involved in an hourly basis, and from that spectrum of hourly flows, it is possible to determine the maximum contribution to the coalition's flow. 
